FREGE ON SENSE AND NOMINATUM PDF

In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference ‘, ‘referent’, ‘Meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” ( German: Sinn) to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. Equality* gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation. Phil Language. Basic idea: phrases (like definite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense.

Author: Groramar Meztishicage
Country: Sao Tome and Principe
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Sex
Published (Last): 11 June 2012
Pages: 160
PDF File Size: 14.72 Mb
ePub File Size: 18.77 Mb
ISBN: 369-2-28364-328-3
Downloads: 77443
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Nataxe

Gottlob Frege, On sense and nominatum – PhilPapers

All pages needing factual verification Wikipedia articles needing factual verification from December This early theory of meaning explains how the significance or reference of a sentence its truth value depends on the significance or reference of its parts. This is known as the descriptivist theory of names. Rather, there will be a difference in cognitive value only if there is a difference in the “mode of presentation”, which Frege illustrates using a geometrical example.

University of Chicago Press, This page was last edited on 18 Decemberat Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence — its truth value — appear.

Descriptions such as ‘the President of the U. I’ll write free-form comments when assessing students Remove points from rubric Don’t post Outcomes sfnse to Learning Mastery Gradebook Use this rubric for assignment grading Hide score total for assessment results Cancel Create Rubric.

  BELAJAR PHOTOSCAPE PDF

Thus, “Hesperus is Phosphorous” was supposed to mean something like: The sentences “Hesperus mominatum a planet” and “Phosphorous is a planet” also have different “cognitive values” in German ” Erkenntniswert “, literally: If the evening star has the same reference as the morning starit follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. It is possible for a name to have sense without having a reference. Michael De Medeiros – – Weigl Publishers.

Sense and reference – Wikipedia

How Direct is Visual Perception? Sign in to use this feature. As it happens, this is true: Use this rubric for assignment grading.

Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. The relation of a proper name to the object it designates is direct, whereas a word like ‘planet’ has no such direct relation at all to the Earth at all, but only to a concept that the Earth falls under. Views Read Edit View history. Frege then says that each name has a “sense” that “contains” a “mode sende presentation” that is associated with that name, but most commentators have simply supposed that the sense is the mode of presentation.

On sense and nominatum

Dudman – – Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 2: Bell’, Analysis 40 pp. Pylyshyn – – Cognition 9 2: Frege mentions that, for such reasons, he once held himself in his first book Begriffsschriftor Conceptual Notation that identity was not a relation between objects, but was actually a relation between names. On Sense, Reference, and Tone in History. The problem, however, is that if identity is a relation between objects, then it looks as if “Hesperus is Phosophorous” and “Hesperus is Hesperus” assert that nad the same relation obtainsnamely, a relation between Venus and itself.

  CALENDARIO LUNAR BIODINAMICO 2012 PDF

You need to have JavaScript enabled in order to access this site.

Does that seem right? A Reply to Dr.

Rather, as I said, his purpose here is to hominatum that names do have sense, and that their sense is different from their reference. The thought remains the same whether or not ‘Odysseus’ has a reference.

In particular, the claim is, it is possible for two names to have the same reference but to have different senses. Ordinarily, when one uses a name, one uses it to talk about its reference.

On this theory, the meaning of a complete sentence consists in its being true or false, [5] and the meaning of each significant andd in the sentence is an extralinguistic entity which Frege called its Bedeutungliterally ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference’, ‘referent’, ‘ M eaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc.

And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction does have i.